Stop Calling for a Two-State Solution — Unless You Mean It
An Israeli soldier stands at a bus station near the West Bank Israeli settlement of Beit El, Sept. 11, 2024. (AP Photo/Ohad Zwigenberg)
During the recent U.S. presidential debate, upon being prompted to provide her position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Vice President Kamala Harris continued a long trend in U.S. politics — by conveying her vocal support for the idea of a “two-state solution…where the Palestinians have security, self determination and the dignity they so rightly deserve.”
While many conservatives and staunchly pro-Israel pundits have abandoned even the facade of ever supporting an independent Palestinian state, most centrists, Democratic Party politicians, and elite figures in the popular discourse continue to push rhetorically for this solution.
Their calls for a “two-state solution” remain hollow, however, as most refuse to advocate for the policy changes needed to reach a viable Palestinian state. While global attention is correctly focused on the active conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon in the wake of October 7th, many analysts still believe the largest obstacle to a two-state solution lies in the West Bank — specifically the Jewish-Israeli settlements.
When the Jordanian-occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem were captured by Israel as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, many Israelis — either for religious or economic reasons — began to settle sporadically on the newly occupied land. Since then, the population of Israeli ‘settlers’ living in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem has grown to over 700,000, bringing with them the protection of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and a robust security apparatus that remains in place today.
The now nearly 60 year occupation has consisted of routine raids, home demolitions, the displacement of Arabs, assassinations, airstrikes, movement restrictions, and perhaps most consequentially, a complex network of private bypass highways, military checkpoints, and Jewish-only settlements that splinter off Palestinian communities from each other. Many of the settlements that have been growing for decades now resemble towns and even small cities. These scattered settlements and the IDF-protected infrastructure and transportation to and from Israel is perhaps the most pressing obstacle to a two-state solution.
Under these conditions, a continuous Palestinian state that includes the West Bank and East Jerusalem is, simply put, not viable.
Palestinians examine damage after an Israeli airstrike in the West Bank city of Tulkarem on Friday, Oct. 4, 2024, which Palestinian officials say killed 18 people and the IDF says killed a Hamas leader (AP Photo/Nasser Nasser)
Since the inception of Israel’s settler movement, its threat to an eventual peace solution and brazen disregard for human rights has been well documented and scrutinized by a variety of international organizations. The Israeli government’s initial allowance, and eventual encouragement, of the settler movement — via subsidies, tax incentives and infrastructure improvements — has been routinely condemned by motions in the United Nations. Typically, Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits an occupying power from “[transferring] its own civilian population into the territory it occupies,” is cited.
Even The United States, under President Barack Obama, condemned settlement expansion. Famously, he chose to have the US abstain and allow a 2016 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution to pass, which reaffirmed that the settlements are a “flagrant violation of international law.” The motion passed with votes in-favor from all 14 other UNSC members. Israel still disregarded the motion with little pressure.
The Trump administration decisively reversed Obama’s more measured approach to the conflict — a trend largely continued by current President Joe Biden. In response to Israel’s announcement in February 2024 of further settlement expansion, the Biden administration did reinstate a previous Obama-era U.S. ruling which classifies the settlements as “illegitimate.” The term “illegal,” adopted widely by the UN in reference to the settlements, is still notably not chosen. Early indications suggest a potential Harris administration would likely manage the conflict similarly — despite rhetorically projecting a more sympathetic tone towards Palestinian rights.
American condemnations of Israeli settlements have never been backed by any major change in U.S. policy. For decades in fact, the situation has mostly deteriorated further as settlement construction continues and the Israeli government tightens its grip on its established settler colonies.
After the First Intifada (1987-1993), a mass resistance movement among Palestinian activists in opposition to the Israeli policies, the occupation was becoming untenable. In secret talks hosted by Norway in 1993, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israeli representatives negotiated the first bilateral agreement — consenting to mutual recognition of each other (not as a State of Palestine but the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people), the temporary halting of settlement expansion, and the outline for future negotiations.
Oslo II, a follow-up deal in 1995, divided up the occupied West Bank into three zones with varying levels of Israel and local Palestinian rule, via the newly created Palestinian Authority (PA). This was ostensibly intended to be a temporary plan before a final peace solution was to be decided by the end of the century.
However, opponents of the peace process quickly lept into action. Particularly, the prominent Israeli right-wing Likud Party and Palestinian Islamic nationalist group Hamas, founded during the First Intifada, became committed to reversing the Oslo Accords.
Less than two months after the signing of Oslo II, Labor Party Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, a supporter of the peace process, was assassinated by a far-right Israeli extremist who felt Rabin had sold Israel out to the Palestinians. The shocking murder came despite the agreement’s modest nature that had failed to resolve many of the most important aspects of the conflict, such as the political control of Jerusalem, the right of return for the Palestinian diaspora, and, of course, the permanent status of the Israeli settlements.
Within six months, Rabin’s Labor Party predecessor was defeated in new elections by Likud Party Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The new government, elected in 1996, barely mentioned the Oslo Accords and immediately restarted the expansion, further solidifying the settlements.
Hamas, for its part, refused to accept the terms of the Oslo Accords and, by extension, the legitimacy of the PA. The movement boycotted the 1996 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) Elections, which brought about the first elected PA governing body, and launched terrorist attacks against Israel to disrupt the peace process and respond to Israeli provocations.
In this sense, right-wing Palestinian and Israeli factions on both sides overpowered the PA and the Israeli Labor Party which were inching towards a negotiated settlement.
As the peace process broke down through cyclical escalations during the late 1990s, Palestinians launched the Second Intifada (2000-2005), which was substantially more violent than the first. Hamas, along with other militant Palestinian factions, embraced suicide bombings as a tactic — giving Israel the justification it needed to construct a large separation wall between Israel and the occupied territories.
Although Israelis marketed the wall to the international community as solely an effort to prevent terrorist attacks and infiltration from Palestinian groups, critics suggest that the true motive of the wall’s construction was to de-facto annex large swaths of territory, given its inclusion of many West Bank settlements on the Israeli side.
Despite the clear obstacle to a two-state solution that the settlements and separation wall present, Harris and other mainstream U.S. politicians that verbally support a negotiated deal refuse to support efforts to boycott Israeli goods produced in the occupied territories — let alone apply pressure on Israel to begin forcefully evacuating the settlements.
Perhaps no mainstream politicians will admit the reality; that until Israel dismantles its settler-colonial institutions, a Palestinian state is implausible at best.
The required exodus of this magnitude is not without precedent, as the settlement situation remarkably resembles the history of French Algeria.
French troops preparing for a major raid in a notorious Arab quarter of Algiers, Algeria, which resulted in the rounding up of 4,480 Arabs during the Algerian War of Independence, May 27, 1956.(AP Photo)
Similarly to how Israelis consider the West Bank settlements an integral part of the Israeli state, France viewed its Algerian colony, conquered in the mid-nineteenth century, as inseparable from Metropolitan France. Throughout the century and a half that France directly controlled Algeria, French and other European colonists established large communities in the most desirable coastal parts of the country — displacing the native Arab population and subjecting them to colonial rule.
By the 1960s however, after a prolonged conflict and in the wake of other worldwide decolonial movements, France had little choice but to pull out of Algeria — bringing the majority of the roughly 1 million European colonists with them.
Perhaps more directly applicable to the current situation is Gaza in 2005. When faced with the enormous cost during the Second Intifada to protect the 8,000 Israeli settlers in Gaza, and burdened with the mounting international pressure to address the peace process, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ordered the IDF to force the settlers out in a unilateral “disengagement” operation. Although justified domestically as a “pivot” to the West Bank, many right-wing Israelis still deplored the action as it went “surprisingly smoothly” and set the precedent for future settlement evacuations.
Addressing the issue of the Israeli settlement network through various forms of international pressure must become part of the mainstream debate. Though a full evacuation may not be practical, forcing the discussion to confront the issue allows the possibility of negotiating land-swaps and land deals for peace and a two-state solution. More so than other obstacles such as the status of Jerlusalem and the Palestinian “Right of Return,”the Israeli settlements provide a systemic and growing obstacle to a Palestinian state.
In addition to calling for an immediate ceasefire and the reconstruction of Gaza, policy makers and leaders should be openly and aggressively challenging the legitimacy of Israel's West Bank settlements. Or, at the very least, they should spare us from the disingenuous and cynical postering in favor of a two-state solution.
Dear Reader,
This op-ed explores the complexities of the Israel-Palestine conflict. We are aware this is a sensitive topic, and it is impossible to address all the nuances of the issue. We recognize that personal experiences with delicate matters can vary greatly, and we invite constructive conversation. Please note that this article reflects the author's views and is intended to contribute to a broader dialogue. We encourage readers to approach this piece with an open mind and consider the perspectives shared.
—Rebecca Locher, Editor-in-Chief