Op-Ed: Will People’s Lives Change After the Civil War in Myanmar Ends?
Vendors selling groceries wait for customers at a local market in Naypyitaw, Myanmar. (AP Photo/Aung Shine Oo)
Since the military coup four years ago, which ousted the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar has descended into a full-blown civil conflict, becoming a hotbed for organized crime. Resistance groups, particularly ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) executing Operation 1027 in late Oct., 2023, have steadily gained momentum, overwhelming the military’s ability to respond. This operation initially launched and centered on the northern Shan state eventually replicated in conflict theatres across the country. This operation consistently moved in a single direction that favored the resistance, where the Myanmar military lacked the capacity to alter its course. If this power shift continues, the resistance could eventually overthrow the military. However, even if they succeed in toppling the regime, the central question remains: can the country’s future leadership, whether military or democratic, improve the lives of ordinary citizens?
Amid the ongoing civil war, a lucrative drug trade has emerged. Myanmar has become the world's biggest hub for organized crime. It is now the largest producer of opium and one of the leading manufacturers of synthetic drugs, including methamphetamine, ketamine, and fentanyl. Tablets produced in Myanmar fuel drug habits in distant countries like Australia, and neighboring countries such as China and India supply the raw materials for their production.
Farmers who once grew poppies in remote mountains and valleys to avoid authorities can now openly cultivate opium flowers in their villages – next to churches, temples, police stations, and town halls – without fear. Myanmar, while being a narco-state, is also the world’s largest exporter of certain heavy rare earth elements that power the booming global market of clean energy. These rare elements, extracted from illegal mines, are smuggled to China along old trafficking routes. In addition to rare earth elements, Myanmar is home to some of the world's finest jade and rubies. However, many young men extracting these precious stones are also addicted to the very drugs that are flooding the global market.
While the military has participated in these illicit industries, few ethnic groups in Myanmar’s borderlands,working with networks connected to Chinese kingpins,have been kidnapping people from around the world to force them into factories running online scams. These operations have generated billions of dollars from victims on a global scale. The profits from these crimes which benefit the military and ethnic warlords are not only destroying lives of civilians but also fueling the success of black market industries in other countries.
The three states where the organized crimes are predominantly taking place (UN Myanmar Information Management Unit/ Agnes Chang)
The Shan state of northern Myanmar which is currently controlled by EAOs although the military regime still holds some control in certain areas, refers to the opium poppy as the “peace flower.” Operation 1027, launched in the Shan State, has placed nearly all of this region under the control of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), or the United Wa State Army (UWSA). These groups have fortified their military positions and consolidated local governance structures. The irony of this territory, home to the so-called “peace flower,” is that while tensions exist between the EAOs and the military, there are also internal struggles among the EAOs for control. This region holds strategic value, sharing borders with China and Thailand, and whoever controls it can solidify not only political and military power but also economic dominance, particularly over the drug trade. Farmers here believe that with neither a government nor military imposing restrictions, they no longer need to hide their activities. Many see this as the best time ever for opium cultivation and are willing to sell their crops to either the military or the EAOs, as long as they earn enough to survive. While warlords in self-administered regions have long overseen the drug economy, the military and its proxies have also taken a share of the profits.
The Kachin state is home to hundreds of unregulated rare earth mines operating near the border with China. Before the coup, there were around 15 mines near Pangwa, a town bordering China, but after the coup, that number increased fivefold. The heart of Myanmar’s rare earth mining operation was controlled by an ethnic Kachin militia allied with the junta. With no environmental or labor safeguards, Pangwa became engulfed in high-intensity mining. Like other mining towns in Kachin, Pangwa has been devastated, and people’s lives continue to deteriorate. The wages earned by laborers here often go toward buying drugs, creating a cycle where work destroys their health, and addiction ruins their lives. After Operation 1027, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) overran 200 military bases and secured 14 towns in Kachin State. Even regions under Kachin resistance control have been heavily mined. In 2023, Myanmar was believed to be the world’s largest exporter of certain heavy rare earth elements, with exports exceeding China’s own domestic mining quota, raising the question of who is behind these mines currently: the military or the resistance groups?
China has been involved in the Myanmar crisis for various reasons, along with other countries that benefit from the conflict’s profits. Under Laos’ ASEAN leadership, the bloc’s position on Myanmar became unclear, and the political will to end the violence and resume political reforms weakened. Laos was reluctant to propose a solution and instead leaned toward Thailand and China to take the lead in decision-making. This raises questions about whether the infamous drug trade between Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand may be a factor in the lack of strong action. With Malaysia leading ASEAN this year, the bloc has called on Myanmar to end the war and allow humanitarian assistance. ASEAN has stated that the elections the junta hopes to hold are not the priority—what matters most is securing a ceasefire. Malaysia’s leadership appears to signal a renewed interest in action, which could have a positive impact on resolving the ongoing conflict.
Over the past four years, both the military and those fighting for democracy and regional autonomy have relied on illegal profits as the easiest way to fuel their war efforts. What those in power see as a quick way to generate capital for war is, may be used for national development tomorrow. Regardless of whether the military regime or the EAOs prevail, the key question is not which form of governance will take hold, but how those in power will address the country’s economic burdens, especially after the widespread destruction of infrastructure and resources. For ordinary people in the Shan state, for example, opium cultivation will likely remain their most profitable option, as both the military and ethnic groups continue to finance the trade, fueling a global illicit economy.
A camp for internally displaced people in Shan state that was damaged by a military airstrike (The New York Times/Adam Ferguson)
So will people’s lives change after the war ends? The answer lies not just in who controls the country but in how the next government, whether led by the military or democratic forces, addresses the deep-seated issues plaguing Myanmar. Can a nation torn apart by years of conflict, corruption, and illicit economies truly rebuild? For Myanmar to emerge from the shadows of organized crime and widespread suffering, it must not only seek political solutions but also engage with the international community, particularly from organizations like the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to dismantle the systems that have enabled the drug trade, illegal mining, and exploitation. Without breaking free from these destructive cycles, any progress made will be temporary. As the country’s future hangs in the balance, one must ask: Will Myanmar’s leaders choose to break the chains of its dark past, or will they perpetuate the very systems that have brought its people to the brink of collapse?