Turkey, Ukraine, & the Crimean Tatars: Between Diaspora & World Powers

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who recently recovered from COVID-19, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (right) in Kyiv on Feb. 3, 2022. Photo: Reuters, via Al-Jazeera.

Last week, as the threat of further Russian aggression loomed over Ukraine, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan traveled to Kyiv in an effort to ameliorate tensions. He did not solve the burgeoning crisis, but he did position his country as another player in the complex story of Russian-Western relations. In particular, his increasingly cavalier approach to human rights, in what was historically one of the more democratic Middle Eastern countries, allows him to find common ground with Russia and China. The budding relationship between these two powers, what the Times recently referred to as “an alliance of autocracies,” has seen increased economic ties between the two of them and Turkey. However, Erdogan has come out in favor of Ukraine on the question of further territorial conflict; in doing so, he has reiterated his government’s support for Ukraine’s Turkic minority, the Crimean Tatars.  

Crimean Tatars are Crimea’s indigienous ethnic group; today, they number roughly 15 percent of the population of the peninsula. Historically a Muslim, Turkic-language speaking community, almost the entire Crimean Tatar population of Ukraine was deported by Stalin in 1944; survivors only returned after the fall of the Soviet Union. For a host of historical and practical reasons, Crimean Tatars by-and-large support Ukrainian control of the peninsula, which gave partial autonomy to the region and recognized local governmental bodies such as the Majlis (an elected council of Crimean Tatar community leaders). Ukraine, though its government faces recurring allegations of corruption, is a relatively democratic country that offers much more religious and cultural freedom than its eastern neighbor. Since 2014, when Crimea was annexed by Russia, Crimean Tatars have been subjected to persecution by an increasingly Russian-nationalist occupation, and civil society groups have been banned. In 2019 alone, 34 of 71 Crimean political prisoners identified by a prominent Russian human rights group were of Crimean Tatar descent. 

Turkey traditionally treats the Crimean Majlis, a representative body in exile for Crimean Tatars, as formal proxies for the community. After a meeting between President Erdogan’s staff and the Majlis’ leaders in Kyiv, the Ukrainian foreign ministry told reporters from regional outlet Al-Monitor that “For Turkey, Crimea is Ukraine, and Crimean Tatars are citizens of our state.”

Ibrahim Kalin (right), Chief Advisor to President Erdogan, with Ukrainian MP and former Commissioner for the Affairs of the Crimean Tatar People Mustafa Jamilov in Kyiv, Feb. 3, 2022. Photo: Ibrahim Kalin via Twitter.

In 2014, at the onset of Russia’s occupation, Turks of Crimean Tatar heritage (many of whom had lived in Turkey for generations) staged protests in Istanbul, chanting “Turkey, help your brothers.” Ukraine has sought out Turkey as a non-EU ally in any competition with Russia; Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (herself of Crimean Tatar heritage) has even said that Ukraine would be interested in taking on an observer position in the Organization of Turkic States. Ukrainian forces, currently undertaking military exercises, use Turkish-made Bayraktar drones.

In August, Turkey was among the first five nations to join the “Crimea Platform” diplomatic effort sponsored by Ukraine. Akif Çağatay Kılıç, chairperson of the Turkish Grand National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee, said in October that Crimea remained one of the primary complicating factors of  Russia-Turkish relations: “There is a problem between Ukraine and Russia. Turkey is being close to Russia and Ukraine but making its arguments and ideas very clear. We do not recognize and accept the annexation of Crimea by Russia…But on the same side, we also have good relations with Russia.” 

In some ways the situation draws parallels to the status of Uighurs in Turkey, where an existing diaspora has expanded as members of the Turkic-speaking, predominantly Muslim, ethnic group in Xinjiang seek refuge from China’s repressive and culturally genocidal policies. While China and Turkey otherwise have much in common-- both have governments relatively indifferent to human rights and focus instead on economic growth -- Turkey and China's relationship has been strained to some degree by the significant Uighur minority which lives in Turkey (especially in Istanbul and Ankara, the capital). Turkey has essentially stopped granting Uighurs visas in recent years -- civil rights activists say the community has been intimidated in an effort to reduce vocal protestations of Chinese policy-- but the very existence of the diaspora community in Turkey has complicated Turkish-Chinese relations. 

With Turkey seeking to become the chair of liberal (if not democratic) Islam in the Middle East and Central Asia, it has wrestled with what obligations, if any, it has to protect the human rights of Turkic and Muslim ethnic groups in its authoritarian allies. Erdogan’s more nationalist stances may come into conflict with economically advantageous cooperation with Russia and China; in the meantime, the Ukrainian-Turkish alliance will remain the subject of intense diplomatic focus.