Op-Ed: Will the US Stand by Taiwan? Probably Not.
Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te speaking in Taipei (Photo: The New York Times/Annabelle Chih)
Tensions between China and Taiwan have reached alarming heights as a surge in military activity from Beijing heightens the possibility of warfare. A key instigator is the 2024 election of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, who describes himself as a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence.” Lai’s election coincides with an exacerbation in Chinese aggression, including a 300 percent increase in military flights around Taiwan since May and a major October drill involving Chinese army, navy, air, and rocket forces that encircled the island. Most recently, in early November, over 35 Chinese military aircraft, including nuclear-capable H-6 bombers and drones, were detected flying to the south of Taiwan for two consecutive days.
The rise in hostility may necessitate support from the United States, particularly as Taiwan’s capability to respond militarily is constrained. While the Taiwanese government has introduced legislation to strengthen its defense, the harsh reality is that the island simply cannot match China’s military power on its own. While Lai Ching-te’s predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, extended mandatory conscription and oversaw seven consecutive increases to the defense budget, Taiwan is still not moving fast enough. Even if President Lai pushes the total budget to the planned $20 billion in 2025, this accounts for just 2.5 percent of Taiwan’s GDP—far below the 3 percent target set nearly two decades ago, and much lower than the defense spending of nations facing similar territorial threats such as Israel.
As Beijing concurrently announced a 7.2 percent increase in its defense budget for 2024 despite economic slowdown, Taiwanese support from the US—which is obligated by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act—is crucial to shrink the widening military gap between China and Taiwan. While the act requires the US to provide Taiwan the means to defend itself, actualizing as tens of billions of dollars in arms sales, Washington has historically maintained a policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding Taiwan, deliberately keeping Beijing uncertain about the extent of direct American intervention in a conflict. However, despite differences in rhetoric, recent statements from both the Democratic and Republican party have indicated that the status-quo is changing, and the US will not defend the island.
A screen grab showing large-scale military exercises around Taiwan (Photo: NBC News/Feng Hao)
Current President Joe Biden has ironically vocalized support for Taiwan repeatedly while in office, even unequivocally affirming that the US would intervene militarily to defend the island in the event of a Chinese invasion—a position seen as a direct endorsement of Taiwan’s self-governance. In May 2023, Biden reinforced this stance, stating “The US is standing up for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,” and emphasizing his readiness to use force to protect US allies and core interests. Yet, his administration has quickly walked back his remarks each time. Officials like Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan reiterated Washington’s support of a One China policy, demonstrating that Democrats will not fight against China in the name of defending democracy.
While the Democratic party hides their unwillingness to defend Taiwan behind empty promises, Republican presidential-elect Donald Trump has been direct in his dissatisfaction regarding US-Taiwan relations. In stark contrast to his first presidential administration that approved an $8 billion sale of F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan in 2019, Trump compared US aid to an insurance policy, suggesting in a July 2024 interview with Bloomberg Businessweek that the island should “pay us for defense.” His frustration signals the unlikeliness of US military intervention in Taiwan under a Trump administration. Later in the same interview, Trump pointed out that “Taiwan is 9,500 miles away,” mirroring growing domestic opposition to foreign entanglements among Americans. As ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East fuel skepticism toward intervention abroad, bipartisan gridlock in Congress over foreign aid further undermines Taiwan’s hope for US support. Although Trump’s recent nomination of Marco Rubio, a vocal critic of China, as Secretary of State may seem promising for Taiwan, it is more likely that Rubio would adhere to Trump’s agenda to present a united front among the Republican party.
Both parties have gone further to threaten Taiwan’s own defenses by eradicating its “silicon shield,” referring to the dominant semiconductor industry that keeps it so valuable to the west. The Biden administration’s 2022 CHIPS and Science Act aims to reduce US reliance on Taiwan’s semiconductor industry and boost domestic production of chips. President-elect Trump has similarly articulated his belief that Taiwan has taken “almost 100 percent of the industry from the United States,” indicating that a second Trump administration will continue these initiatives. This could strip Taiwan of its most significant leverage with Western allies, and exponentially increase their vulnerability.
Taiwan now faces the dual threat of an increasingly aggressive China alongside nonexistent support from its most critical ally, the United States. As combat becomes more probable, Taiwan may stand alone against China. However, this will prove detrimental to the United States in large part due to Taiwan’s powerful geographical position in Asia. Taiwan is located at a key point in the First Island Chain, which connects a network of US partners from the Japanese archipelago down to the Philippines and into the South China Sea. As long as Taiwan remains outside Beijing’s control, China’s military cannot extend much power beyond its own water. Protecting Taiwan then becomes a critical step in maintaining both the security of the region and the defense of US interests in the Indo-Pacific.
As the region is home to over half of the world’s population and accounts for a substantial share of global trade, the Indo-Pacific moreover has the power to dramatically shift global power dynamics. A Taiwan under Chinese control would not only mark a significant shift in regional dominance but could also undermine the United States’ standing as a global superpower. Such a loss would damage Washington's ability to project influence across the region and erode its credibility as a champion of democratic values. This erosion of "soft power" would go beyond Asia, emboldening authoritarian regimes and destabilizing the global order that the US has sought to uphold since the end of World War II.
As Taiwan stands out as one of few democratic success stories in Asia, the United States needs to both uphold the Taiwan Relations Act and go beyond to voice stronger support of Taiwan, committing both our financial and military aid to the island as Chinese aggression grows. Failing to do so risks not only Taiwan’s sovereignty, but also the preservation of an international system led by the United States and democratic ideals.