Russia’s War on Ukraine: Ukrainian Counter-Offensive and Putin’s Response
Ukrainian soldiers returning from the Kherson front line. Photo: Daniel Berehulek / New York Times.
On Oct. 10, at 12:00pm, the NYU Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia and the Harriman Institute co-hosted a seminar about the recent developments in the war in Ukraine following the Russian invasion. The event came only weeks after Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive in Kherson, Russia’s partial mobilization, along with heated events of the past few days in the Kerch Strait and this morning’s missile attacks in Kyiv.
Oxana Shevel, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University and current President of the American Association for Ukrainian Studies, began the conversation with several broader insights about the war, first noting that the Ukrainian counteroffensive marked a new stage in its progression. Shevel stated that the past few weeks demonstrated Ukraine could win militarily on the battlefield which many did not believe previously.
Conversely, Shevel also discussed several points that have reinforced over the past several weeks and months. These include Vladimir Putin’s determination to subdue Ukraine, his attempts to deprive Ukraine of its statehood, and the continuation of Russia’s mass atrocities and war crimes. Finally, Shevel addressed those in the West who have been calling for negotiations– she stated that Putin has made no indication that he wants to compromise on his maximalist goals or withdraw from any territories. Shevel believed, along with many Ukrainians, that any calls for negotiations or cease-fire will be used by Putin to bring in more forces and attack. Even if Putin tries to coerce Ukraine into some kind of appeasement strategy, she added, Ukraine has proven its agency and we should take the political actors of Ukraine very seriously.
Michael Kofman, Research Program Director in the Russian Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) and Fellow at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center, followed with some analyses on the military situation of the war. He began by stating that since late August, Ukraine has been more successful in building manpower and morale, which has helped gather Western military assistance and thus yielded greater combat power. The biggest issue for the Russian army, according to Kofman, is Moscow’s inability to resolve the longstanding discord between the political goals of its leadership and military. Kofman explained that the Russian Army has been suffering a structural deficit in manpower including retention of personnel, rotation of personnel, and recruitment. However, Russia’s decision to mobilize generally introduces uncertainty and poses political risks because deploying mobilized personnel heading into the winter, as opposed to the spring or summer, may have very negative effects.
A Russian recruit bids farewell to his son before departing on a train in the Volgograd region. Photo: AP.
Kofman also cautioned against assuming the recent events meant the war has already been decided. Ukrainian military officials are still preparing for a protracted war. Kofman also addressed the nuclear escalation risk, which he believes is fairly low but will likely grow in the long-term because of mobilization increasing the political stakes for the regime. He believed the likelihood of Russia losing the war without using nuclear warfare is higher than Russian leadership resorting to nuclear weapons.
Next, Dimitry Goerburg, Senior Research Scientist in the Russian Studies Program at CNA and Associate at the Harvard Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, discussed the new developments of past two days, specifically the bombing of the Kerch Birdge and the Russian response. He first emphasized the symbolism of the incident, explaining that attacking the link between Russia and Crimea exposed Crimea’s vulnerability. Moreover, he explained that the damage on the bridge has complicated Russian logistics for supplying the south. Russia’s missile attack as a response, according to Goerburg, was a retribution attack rather than a sign of a new escalation. In regards to the future, Gorenburg noted that the Ukrainian army will likely launch one more major operation before the winter begins.
On the topic of nuclear threats, Goerburg agreed with Kofman, adding that Russia’s threats served to amplify Western fears of nuclear war and could potentially help Russia undermine support for Ukraine. Goergburg also discussed the topic of China and India’s growing discontentment about the Ukrainian invasion, suggesting that the West should “exploit this tension, to further isolate Russia politically and maybe economically.” Goerburg predicted that Russia cannot win as long as the West continues to provide Ukraine with material support, but Russia cannot admit defeat as long as Putin is in charge.
Next, Anastasiia Vlasenko, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Jordan Center, shared messages and sentiments of lower-rank Ukrainian military officials and civilians from Ukrainian mass media and social media. According to Vlasenko, the counteroffensive was long-expected and a demand shared widely among the Ukrainian army and civilians. In regards to the annexations of four new Ukrainian regions, Vlasenko noted that the algorithm that included referendums on the new annexations very much resembled the events of 2014 which concerned the status of Crimea. Because of this, Ukrainian media focused much more on the counteroffensive than annexations. Most Ukranians do not view the mobilization as a threat, as Russian conscripts tend to be poorly trained and highly unmotivated.
Finally, Timothy Frye, the Marshall D. Shulman Professor of Post-Soviet Foreign Policy at Columbia University, gave several concluding points about the political situation facing Putin. Frye first remarked that the framework for studying autocracies still applies to understanding Putin’s behaviors during the war just as it did before. He comments that Putin has made his job more difficult during the invasion. Since its beginning there has been great fragmentation in not only the elite but also the masses in Russia, who were previously consolidated around a political system. The war was initiated by Russia without preparation with mass or elite opinion. Frye compared the situation to the Vietnam War for the US, before which most Americans viewed the United States as a force of good. Frye explained, “If you look at public opinion polling, Russia’s victory over World War II is the touchstone of Russia’s place in the world. But just as Vietnam forced a difficult conversation about the US’ role in the world, I think the same thing is going on now [in Russia].” Before the Ukrainian invasion, public opinion polling was significantly higher. Russian mobilization exacerbated opposition to the war. Frye continued, “There are some parallels here, and I don’t think that bodes well for Russia.”