2022 US-Japan Security Seminar
Michael Green (top left), Bonny Lin (top right), Kenichiro Sasae (bottom left), and Tetsuo Kotani (bottom right)
Key Points
The United States and Japan are engaging in discussions to reframe security policy in a quickly evolving East-Asian geopolitical climate
Japan is considering its defense spending carefully and working with the US on new economic security investment
The current situation between Russia and Ukraine has many implications for US-Japan cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region
Summary
On Friday, Feb. 18, 2022, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) hosted a virtual panel with leading experts Kenichiro Sasae, Tetsuo Kotani, and Bonny Lin. The event, entitled “2022 US-Japan Security Seminar,” discussed the measures that both countries have implemented for integrated deterrence and economic security. The event was moderated by CSIS Senior Vice President for Asia Michael Green.
The event began with an introductory greeting from H.E. Yoshimasa Hayashi, Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, who elaborated on the long-standing relationship between the US and Japan. Hayashi emphasized the collaborative work of organizations like the JIIA and CSIS in forming and maintaining security and promoting economic cooperation. He concluded his remarks by contextualizing the alliance in the current climate, highlighting the importance of a strengthened alliance during the COVID-19 pandemic, especially under threats from neighboring China and North Korea and in a new age of technological advancement.
Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Yoshimasa Hayashi
Transitioning into the panel, President of JIIA Kenichiro Sasae expanded on the discussion of the current geopolitical context. He noted that the conflict between North Korea and China has evolved in the past decade, pointing specifically to today’s tumultuous climate as compared to that of 2013 when former Japanese security provisions were well laid out in general guidelines and policy agendas. Sasae emphasized that the framework of their current security agenda is leaning more towards diplomatic cooperation but that debates regarding the security of the Pacific Islands and the need to augment defense capabilities are largely shaping Japan’s political landscape and public opinion as controversy rages on.
Green then asked Sasae to describe the “two-plus-two program” that the US and Japan have engaged in, probing specifically the roles of the foreign and defense ministries of the two nations. Sasae introduced the evolving economic component and its critical importance to the new national security policy by examining proposed legislation, especially the recommendations of the National Security Strategy (NSS). He focused on the NSS’s safeguard of fiscal infrastructure in the private sector, technological collaboration, and confidentiality of patents. Green additionally pointed out the establishment and appointment of a major director for technology competition among the Biden administration, to which Sasae followed with a discussion about an increased focus on investment screening from economic semiconductors in the Kantei, the residence of the Japanese Prime Minister. These two steps both indicate that the US and Japan are considering digital modernization for potential policy solutions.
Shifting gears to address defensive capabilities, Green posed a question to Tetsuo Kotani, a Professor of Global Studies at Meikai University and Senior Fellow at JIIA, regarding the defense budget considerations of the Japanese government in a new external environment. Kotani referenced a pledge that Japan took during a two-plus-two dialogue regarding a fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities which later developed into a point of political consensus in lower house elections. He added that the government understands that the defense budget per capita will need to increase in order to achieve its policy goals, and despite the fiscal weight of COVID-19 on the agenda, there is enough political momentum to begin budget reallocation.
Green expanded on Kotani’s discussion by highlighting the Liberal Democratic Party’s platform to increase the defense spending to two percent of the total GDP but questioned how realistic such a goal is and how it would play into the larger Indo-Pacific strategy. Kotani said that the Biden administration’s plans are more reassuring than the Trump administration’s because Biden is seeking coexistence with China and preservation of rules-based order, whereas Trump sought to undermine the CCP and re-shape Chinese government behavior. Still, Kotani and his colleagues believe that the concept of integrated deterrence, despite its efforts to preserve democratic values, has not been comprehensively developed and will likely result in a disappointing basic security framework rather than the anticipated free trade framework.
The Indo-Pacific strategy also concerns the mobilization of troops for the defense of Taiwan, an issue that Green explained has become more pertinent as the world watches the conflict in Ukraine. Though the panel happened before the invasion on Feb. 24, Green moved the conversation over to Bonny Lin, Director of the China Power Project and Senior Fellow for CSIS Asian Security, to explain how Beijing will interpret the artillery duels in Ukraine and how that should inform the next steps for the US and Japan. Lin addressed the two competing views regarding the state of US foreign policy towards Ukraine as it concerns Taiwan; the first being passive, in order to not divert the attention and resources, and the second viewing the conflict in Ukraine as a stepping stone for further global escalation. Further, Lin sided with Green on the latter view in that the situation poses many implications for not only Eastern Europe but also the Indo-Pacific.
China, Lin explained, has maintained the original perspective that Russia will not invade Ukraine, despite recent developments in nuclear exercise that have indicated to the West that perhaps Ukraine is not just a point of negotiation. Even so, referencing the Xi-Putin statement before the Olympics, it is likely that China will support Russia in some capacity but it is unknown whether that would be in the form of political or economic support. However, it is unlikely that China would provide military support to Russia in Ukraine given its careful track record with larger geostrategic ramifications as well as its positive economic relationship with Ukraine.
Finally, Green asked Lin to elaborate on the potential cooperative projects for the US and Japan in regard to Taiwan. Lin responded by mentioning the changing relationship with Japan and Vietnam, the Philippines, and other countries in the South China Sea, and how economic investment and reciprocal assistance models for supply chain resilience are impacting the range of opportunities for Chinese influence in the region. The US and Japan are working together to, directly and indirectly, support Taiwan through economic means and widespread diplomatic relationship improvements in the region.
This report was compiled by Seamas Porter on February 28, 2022 and edited by Sophie Slade.